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IS IT REALLY ALL ABOUT RACE?:
SECTION 1985(3) POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND BEYOND
Lee Pinzow*
The recent scandal involving the Internal Revenue Service’s targeting of
conservative Tea Party groups highlights the need for a judicial remedy to
politically motivated deprivations of legally recognized rights. Section 2 of
the Ku Klux Klan Act, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), presents such a
remedy.
However, it is unclear whether the statute applies to conspiracies
motivated solely by political animus. The U.S. Supreme Court in Griffin v.
Breckenridge and United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott
delved into the question but chose not to resolve the issue. Based on the
Court’s discussion of the statute’s legislative history in Griffin and Scott,
eight of the eleven federal circuit courts to address the issue now require
racial animus to motivate conspiracies against politically defined classes.
Two circuits maintain their pre-Scott application of § 1985(3) conspiracies
motivated by political party affiliation. After Scott, the Second Circuit
applies the racial animus requirement to politically motivated conspiracies
against members of classes defined by common actions or commonly held
beliefs, but it has yet to decide whether its pre-Scott application of
§ 1985(3) to political affiliation motivated conspiracies remains valid. The
district courts within the Second Circuit have articulated different
approaches to applying Second Circuit precedent to political affiliation
animus cases.
This Note describes the holdings of the Second Circuit in the context of
the greater circuit split and examines the approaches taken by the district
courts within the Second Circuit. This Note concludes that the Second
Circuit could resolve the confusion among its district courts by extending
§ 1985(3) to conspiracies motivated solely by political party affiliation but
by requiring racial animus for all other politically motivated conspiracies.
This would remain consistent with the legislative history, historical context,
and Supreme Court interpretation of the Ku Klux Klan Act.

* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Pace University. I
would like to thank Professor Robin Lenhardt for her counsel and advice with this Note. I
also would like to thank all those friends who encouraged me to continue researching and
writing at moments I contemplated not completing this project.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2013, allegations arose that, in the lead up to the 2010
congressional elections, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) targeted Tea
Party–affiliated groups seeking tax-free status for politically motivated
selective review.1 The IRS allegedly sought the donor lists, volunteer lists,
and party affiliations of these conservative organizations‘ officers and
directors.2 IRS officials also inquired about any times that these officers
and directors had previously run for office and about any future political
ambitions these individuals might have.3 An avalanche of news stories
appeared after the Associated Press brought to light a Treasury Department
Inspector General draft report that found Tea Party–affiliated groups were
placed under undue scrutiny by IRS junior staff members.4 Republican
legislators and conservative pundits accused the White House of attempting
to cover up the scandal.5 Some IRS employees believed that President
Obama wanted to ―crack down‖ on conservative organizations seeking notfor-profit status.6 This may have been because ―in every meaningful sense
[these groups] were operating as units of the Republican Party‖ and were
instrumental in the Republican‘s retention of control of the House of
Representatives.7
Forty-one Tea Party groups brought suit against the United States, the
IRS, IRS officials, and U.S. Treasury Department officials.8 The Tea Party
groups allege constitutional violations, violations of the Administrative
Procedure Act,9 and violations of the Internal Revenue Code.10 However,
the Tea Party groups have chosen not to avail themselves of a potential civil
rights statutory remedy.

1. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, The IRS Scandal: Tempest and the Tea Party,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 16, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/
116958-the-irs-scandal-tempest-and-the-tea-party.
2. See Complaint at 20, Linchpins of Liberty et al. v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00777RBW (D.D.C. June 25, 2013) [hereinafter Linchpins Complaint], available at
http://media.aclj.org/pdf/tea-party-complaint-amended.pdf.
3. Id.
4. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Real I.R.S. Scandal, NEW YORKER DAILY COMMENT BLOG
(May 14, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/05/irs-scandal-teaparty-oversight.html; see also The IRS Targeting Controversy: A Timeline, CBS NEWS (May
24, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-irs-targeting-controversy-atimeline/.
5. See Barrett, supra note 1.
6. See Stephen Dinan, IRS Officials Thought Obama Wanted Crackdown on Tea Party
Groups, Worried About Negative Press, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/17/report-irs-staff-acutely-aware-tea-partyantipathy/?page=all. Judicial Watch, a government watchdog group, went so far as to allege
that ―[t]he Obama IRS suppressed the entire tea party movement just in time to help Obama
win reelection.‖ See Cheryl K. Chumley, Judicial Watch Sues IRS for Stonewalling on Tea
Party FOIA, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2013/oct/15/judicial-watch-sues-irs-stonewalling-tea-party-foi/.
7. See Toobin, supra note 4.
8. See Linchpins Complaint, supra note 2, at 1–6.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012).
10. Linchpins Complaint, supra note 2, at 27–40.
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42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)11 provides a federal cause of action to a person
injured by an act in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive that person of his
or her civil rights against any member of said conspiracy. Section 1985(3)
provides this remedy to victims who are members of an identifiable class of
persons targeted because of ―racial, or perhaps [some other] class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus.‖12 The statute could provide an avenue
of relief to Tea Party members if a conspiracy motivated by animus against
the Tea Party, ostensibly part of the Republican Party,13 is within the
intended reach of the statute.
Section 1985(3) originated as section 2 of ―[a]n act to enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other Purposes‖—commonly known today as the Ku Klux
Klan Act or the Civil Rights Act of 1871.14 Congress passed the Act in
response to escalating violence in the Reconstruction South that was
perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan and similar groups against blacks and
Republicans.15 The Act created two ways for the federal government to
combat Klan violence in the South.16 First, the measure created a role for
the federal courts in deterring civil rights violations by imposing federal
civil and criminal penalties for such violations.17 Second, the measure
provided the president with the authority to declare martial law or suspend
habeas corpus to quell violence that interfered with the ―execution of justice
or federal law.‖18
The Supreme Court‘s refusal to declare whether § 1985(3) requires
victims of conspiracies that target members of political organizations to
allege racial animus as a motivating factor, and dicta indicating that such a
requirement may exist, led to a circuit split on the issue.19 The circuits

11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012) (―If two or more persons in any State or Territory
conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal
protection of the laws . . . [and] if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in
his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of
the conspirators.‖).
12. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14. Kenneth A. K. Martin, Note, The Sixth Circuit Takes a Stand: Conklin v. Lovely
and the Extension of Protection Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to Victims of Non-Racial,
Politically Discriminatory Conspiracies, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 733, 735 (1989).
15. Id. at 735–36 & n.12.
16. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 591 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1970). See generally Act of Apr. 20, 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871), ch.
22, 17 Stat. 13.
17. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at
591.
18. See id.
19. See infra Part I.C.
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continue to struggle to define actionable nonracial class-based animus.20
The Second Circuit once rejected the racial animus requirement,21 but
called its previous decision into question in response to the Supreme Court
dicta.22 The Second Circuit elected not to resolve the issue.23 The failure
of both the Supreme Court and Second Circuit to decide whether the racial
animus must motivate conspiracies against members of political parties led
to divergent applications among the district courts within the Second
Circuit.24
As a result, the viability of a potential § 1985(3) claim by members of
Tea Party groups in the Second Circuit may depend on the county in which
the action is brought. It appears that a Tea Party group bringing an action
in Brooklyn may state a § 1985(3) claim related to IRS targeting, but a
group bringing an action in Manhattan may not.25
This Note examines the issues raised by the Court‘s holding in Griffin v.
Breckenridge26 and dicta in United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 610 v.
Scott,27 regarding a potential racial animus requirement for purely political
§ 1985(3) conspiracy claims. In doing so, this Note identifies the circuit
court split over the racial animus requirement and closely examines the
disparate positions taken by the district courts of the Second Circuit. Part I
discusses the historical background of the Ku Klux Klan Act, including the
social and political atmosphere of the Reconstruction South, the
motivations behind Klan violence, and the purpose for the Act derived from
the debates of the 42nd Congress. Part I also summarizes the Supreme
Court‘s treatment of the Act from its enactment to Bray v. Alexandria
Women’s Health Clinic28 and describes a long-lasting circuit split over
whether injuries caused by conspiracies targeting people based on their
political affiliation are actionable under § 1985(3). Part II describes the
different approaches taken by the district courts within the Second Circuit
in their attempts to reconcile the Second Circuit‘s holdings in Keating v.
Carey29 and Gleason v. McBride.30 Part III suggests that the Second
Circuit should accept targeting based on membership in a political party as
sufficient to establish class-based animus.
Part III, furthermore,
recommends that the Second Circuit distinguish between political party
affiliation, and collective action or shared beliefs. By drawing this
distinction and holding the latter insufficient to define class-based animus
required by Griffin and Scott, the proposed position would keep the Second

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Parts I.C.1, II.C.1–2.
403 U.S. 88 (1971).
463 U.S. 825 (1983).
506 U.S. 263 (1993).
706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983).
869 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Circuit in compliance with both Scott and Bray, while reconciling Keating
with Gleason.
I. HISTORICAL PURPOSE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE KU KLUX KLAN ACT
After close to a century of near dormancy, a resurgence of section 2 of
the Ku Klux Klan Act—presently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)—and the
Supreme Court‘s opinions interpreting the statute‘s legislative history, have
led federal courts to disagree over whether Congress intended the Act to
remedy purely political conspiracies. Part I.A illustrates the social and
political landscape that the 42nd Congress faced when debating the Ku
Klux Klan Act. Part I.A also explores the rich legislative history of the Act
to elucidate what motivated Congress to act. Part I.B tracks the evolution
of the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the statute and its legislative
history. Part I.C outlines the federal circuit court split over whether
§ 1985(3) provides a remedy to injuries caused by political conspiracies not
motivated by racial animus.
A. The Historical Background of the Ku Klux Klan Act
The Civil War and Reconstruction drastically changed ―the economic and
political map of the white South.‖31 Before the end of the war, the white
plantation elite lost economic and political power as a result of the Union
administration of abandoned or confiscated plantations,32 execution of
President Abraham Lincoln‘s plan to quickly restore former rebellious
states into the Union,33 and the loss of economic independence of yeoman
farmers.34 The planter class was also ―devastated‖ by battle casualties, loss
31. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA‘S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–
1877, at 17 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., Perennial 2002).
32. See id. at 55. Starting in late 1862, abandoned cotton plantations in Louisiana were
leased to Northern investors to be put back into operation. Id. Former slaves worked on
these plantations for wages, in a ―transition from slave to free labor.‖ Id. In the spring of
1863, General Lorenzo Thomas planned to lease plantations along the Mississippi River to
Northerners and those Southern planters who ―renounced their allegiance to the
Confederacy,‖ on the condition that both groups hire blacks to work under terms set by the
Army. Id. at 57. On January 16, 1865, General William T. Sherman issued Special Field
Order No. 15, which set aside the Sea Island and a portion of the Charleston coast for the
settlement of blacks. See id. at 70. Each family would be granted forty acres of land and
loaned an army mule, to relieve the pressure the increasing mass of freed slaves placed on
army supplies and movement. See id. at 70–71.
33. See id. at 35, 37. On December 8, 1863, President Lincoln issued a Proclamation of
Amnesty and Reconstruction, offering a pardon and restoration of all rights, except for slave
ownership, to anyone who pledged future loyalty to the Union and acceptance of abolition.
See id. A state could establish a new state government and regain representation in Congress
when the number of persons making the pledge reached 10 percent of the votes cast in the
1860 presidential election for that state, so long as the new government drafted a new
constitution abolishing slavery. Id. at 35–36. For example, Louisiana‘s first Reconstruction
constitution ―ratified the overthrow of Louisiana‘s old order.‖ Id. at 49. Delegates included
professionals, ―small businessmen, artisans, and civil servants,‖ reflecting the urban
orientation of the unionist coalition and a departure from the traditional control of
slaveholders. Id.
34. Id. at 17.
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of life savings in Confederate bonds, and the loss of both unpaid labor and
family net worth from emancipation.35
With the end of the war, President Andrew Johnson continued a program
of presidentially directed reconstruction.36
By 1866, congressional
Republicans attempted to adjust presidential Reconstruction with the
passage of a Freedman‘s Bureau bill and a civil rights bill, because they
believed that President Johnson‘s program of restoration of Southern states
did not sufficiently ensure the loyalty of Southern officeholders.37
President Johnson‘s vetoes of both bills, and Congress‘s successful override
of the Civil Rights bill, galvanized radical and moderate Republicans in the
belief that they could no longer work with the President.38 The Republican
Congress wrested control of Reconstruction policy from President Johnson
with its override of the President‘s veto of the Reconstruction Act of
1867.39
Between 1867 and 1869, Southern states engaged in a round of
constitutional conventions to draw up new state constitutions in compliance
with requirements for readmission into the Union.40 These conventions
consisted largely of blacks, Northern Republicans (carpetbaggers) and
Southern Unionists (scalawags).41 Most antebellum officials were barred
from participating and many opponents of Reconstruction who remained
eligible to participate abstained from voting for delegates.42 As a result, the
35. See id. at 129.
36. See id. at 181–83. Initially, President Johnson indicated he would recognize the new
Southern state governments created under Lincoln‘s Amnesty Proclamation—governments
that did not grant black suffrage. Id. at 182. The President also granted amnesty to all
participants in the rebellion who swore an oath of loyalty to the Union unless they were
high-level Confederate officials, owners of more than $20,000 in taxable property, or
another member of thirteen classes of Confederates. Id. at 183. Individuals not granted
general amnesty could gain amnesty upon individual application to the President. Id.
37. See id. at 240–42, 246. The Freedman‘s Bureau bill extended the life of the
Freedman‘s Bureau in the South and provided the federal justice system with the authority to
punish state officials who denied blacks the ―civil rights belonging to white persons.‖ Id. at
243 (quoting Letter from Lyman Trumbull to Dr. William Jayne (Dec. 24, 1865), in DR.
WILLIAM JAYNE PAPERS (on file with Illinois State Historical Society)). The civil rights bill
granted national citizenship to all people, except Native Americans, born in the United
States, and listed certain rights that could not be deprived on the basis of race. Id.
38. See id. at 250–51.
39. See id. at 267, 271. In December of 1866, months before the passage, veto, and veto
override of the Reconstruction Act of 1867, Senator James Grimes described Congress‘s
mood about the upcoming legislative session when he said: ―The President has no power to
control or influence anybody and legislation will be carried on entirely regardless of his
opinions or wishes.‖ Id. at 271. The Act divided the South into five military districts to
ensure internal security and laid out steps for Southern states‘ readmission into the Union,
including writing new state constitutions and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 267. An amendment to the Act clarified that anyone holding an office before the war that
required swearing an oath to the U.S. Constitution could not vote to support these new
constitutions. See Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2.
40. See FONER, supra note 31, at 316–17.
41. See id.
42. See id.; Lou Falkner Williams, The Constitution and the Ku Klux Klan on Trial:
Federal Enforcement and Local Resistance in South Carolina, 1871–1872, 2 GA. J. S. LEGAL
HIST. 41, 43 (1993).
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former white political elite did not recognize the legitimacy of the resulting
governments.43 A common belief within this group was that the resulting
state governments were incapable of representing Southern gentlemen
because of their composition.44 Southern whites were also infuriated by
Republican reliance on property taxes to fund public schools, hospitals,
mental health facilities, and other internal improvements.45 Despite the
failure of property taxes as a method of land redistribution,46 large Southern
landowners perceived the tax program as a method to force owners to sell
unused land, often in small parcels, and to collect land forfeited after tax
defaults to distribute to freedmen.47 Resentment over newly imposed high
taxes ―undermined the authority of the Republican government, as surely
as . . . racism.‖48
In 1868, violence, long a tool in enforcing social mores,49 entered the
electoral process.50 The Ku Klux Klan launched a ―reign of terror‖ on
white and black Republican leaders and black voters, to prevent the election
of the Republican slate of federal and state officials.51 White gangs also
attacked Republican political meetings and destroyed local Republican
newspapers.52 It is clear from the 1868 election results that the aim of this
violence was the defeat of Republican candidates from the president down
to the local level.53
The Klan expanded its use of violence in nearly every Southern state in
response to the imposition of congressional Reconstruction and the election
of Republicans in 1868.54 The Klan acted as a counterrevolutionary
43. See FONER, supra note 31, at 346; Williams, supra note 42, at 44–45. Men who held
a position requiring an oath of office to the U.S. Constitution before the Civil War were
denied voting rights if they supported the Confederacy during the war. See Act of Mar. 23,
1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; FONER, supra note 31, at 275; Williams, supra note 42, at 43.
44. See Williams, supra note 42, at 45 (quoting Benjamin F. Perry, Speech at Anderson
Court House 10–11 (March 1868), in Benjamin F. Perry Papers, microformed on S.
Historical Collection of the Univ. of N.C. Library (Photographic Serv., Univ. of N.C.
Library)). The white political elite confronted new governments controlled by three
disfavored groups: blacks, believed not to be entitled to a role in governance; carpetbaggers,
or Northerners generally hated by Southerners; and scalawags, considered traitors or lepers
among Southerners loyal to the Confederacy. See FONER, supra note 31, at 297, 346–47.
45. See Williams, supra note 42, at 46.
46. See FONER, supra note 31, at 376.
47. See Williams, supra note 42, at 46.
48. Id. at 47.
49. See FONER, supra note 31, at 17, 119–21, 425. From the beginning of the Civil War,
Unionists in the South were persecuted. See id. at 17. ―They were driven from their
homes . . . persecuted like wild beasts by the rebel authorities, and hunted down in the
mountains; they were hanged on the gallows, shot down and robbed.‖ Id. (quoting CARL
MONEYHON, REPUBLICANISM IN RECONSTRUCTION TEXAS 18 (1980)). At the end of the war,
this expanded to include violence against Blacks, motivated by a determination to stop
Blacks from establishing autonomy from their former owners. See id. at 119–21.
50. See id. at 342.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 343. Democratic candidate for president Horatio Seymour won Georgia
and Louisiana, two states where Klan violence decimated the Republican Party organization.
Id. Even in states where Grant won, the Republican vote fell sharply. Id.
54. See id. at 425.
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military force ―serving the interests of the Democratic Party, the planter
class,‖ and those who supported a return to white supremacy.55 The Klan
sought to reverse the sweeping political and economic changes resulting
from the Civil War and Reconstruction by destroying Republican
infrastructure, undermining what the majority of white Southerners deemed
as illegitimate Reconstructionist state governments, reasserting control over
blacks as a source of labor, and restoring the social subordination of
blacks.56 Klan members attacked blacks to force them to renounce their
allegiance to the Republican Party and drive them from other employment
back to the plantations.57 They also attacked whites and their property for
voting the Republican ticket or helping to educate blacks.58 The Klan
murdered both black and white Republican leaders and elected officials.59
One Democrat in the 42nd Congress rationalized the violence as a result of
the stripping of political power and control of Southern governments from
―the wise, virtuous, influential men of the South [to give] to adventurers
and negroes.‖60 It became clear to Republicans in the North that the Ku
Klux Klan and like groups were engaged in a campaign of intimidation,
terror, and violence directed at blacks and white Republicans throughout the
South ―in an attempt to overthrow the Reconstruction policy of the
Republican Congress.‖61
The legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act indicates that the
President and Congress intended to address violence that was motivated by
racial animus or the restoration of political control of local and state
governments.
On March 28, 1871, President Ulysses S. Grant sent a special message to
Congress that urged legislation to address an intensifying level of political
and racial violence in the South, which was perpetrated by the Ku Klux
Klan and other similar groups.62
Congress was also independently concerned about the targeted violence
in the South. On March 10, 1871, a select committee of the Senate issued a
55. See id.
56. See id.; see also Janet A. Barbiere, Note, Conspiracies to Obstruct Justice in the
Federal Courts: Defining the Scope of Section 1985(2), 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1210, 1224–
25, 1227 (1982).
57. See Williams, supra note 42, at 52.
58. See id.
59. See FONER, supra note 31, at 426–28.
60. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 386 (1871) (statement of Rep. Joseph
Lewis); Mark Fockele, Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original
Purpose, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 402, 408 n.31 (1979).
61. Joseph A. Culig, Note, Farber v. City of Paterson: The Third Circuit Weighs In on
the Future of Protecting Political Classes Under Section 1985(3), 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 1053,
1056 (2008) (quoting Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modern
Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 534 (1985)); see also Barbiere,
supra note 56, at 1225; Fockele, supra note 60, at 404–05 (concluding that Congress passed
the Ku Klux Klan Act to address the violence and ―acts of terror,‖ motivated by Southern
resistance to political equality).
62. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1871); see 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 591; Barbiere, supra note 56, at 1225;
Martin, supra note 14, at 735.
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report on the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, using North Carolina as a case
study.63 The report emphasized that the Klan acted with the political
purpose to oppose the policies of Reconstruction, including black
enfranchisement.64 Both the Senate‘s instruction to its Judiciary Committee
and the Select Committee report‘s conclusions expressed a desire to stop
violence not only against blacks but against Republicans, Northern
businessmen, and Unionist Southerners.65 Additionally, the House directed
a joint committee, established to investigate violence in the South, to
ascertain whether organized bands of a ―political character‖ were
responsible for the reported violence, and whether people and property in
the South were secure.66
Two weeks after the Senate report, Representative Samuel Shellabarger
introduced H.R. 320, intended to secure and expand the protections of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 to all people deprived of rights derived from
national citizenship.67 Section 2 of the original bill established criminal
penalties for a list of acts contemplated or completed for the purpose of
either depriving another of their rights or preventing state governments
from enforcing their laws.68 The House debates over the bill between
March 28 and April 6, 1871 covered both the concerns that motivated the
eventual passage of the Act and the concerns over the breadth of its
language.69 The record in the House contains many statements from the
floor indicating that Klan violence targeted Republicans.70
Much of Representative William Stoughton‘s testimony referenced the
March 10 Senate report on violence in North Carolina in support of his
argument that Klan violence was politically motivated.71 Stoughton argued
63. See S. REP. NO. 42-1, at I–II (1871); see also Neil H. Cogan, Section 1985(3)’s
Restructuring of Equality: An Essay on Texts, History, Progress, and Cynicism, 39 RUTGERS
L. REV. 515, 555–56 (1987).
64. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 556.
65. See id. at 566.
66. Fockele, supra note 60, at 408 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 42-1, at ii (1871)).
67. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 556 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app.
68 (1871)).
68. See Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modern Vision of
42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 537 n.17 (1985) (―That if two or more
persons shall . . . conspire . . . to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or
immunities of another person, which . . . would, under any law of the United States then in
force, constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and
battery, perjury, subornation of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal process or resistance of
officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or larceny; and if one or more of the parties to
said conspiracy . . . shall do any act to effect the object thereof, all the parties to . . . said
conspiracy or combination . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and . . . shall be
punishable as such in the courts of the United States.‖ (quoting the original text of section 2
of H.R. 320 from CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68–69 (1871))); see also Barbiere,
supra note 56, at 1228.
69. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at
597–620.
70. See infra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
71. See Michael Scott Russell, Note, The Ku Klux Klan Act and the Proper Perspective
on the Scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 2 REGENT U. L. REV. 73, 77 (1992). Representative
William Stoughton was a Republican from Michigan in the 42nd Congress who spent a
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that the Klan served a political purpose and was comprised of members of
the Democratic—or Conservative—party who sought to use violence
against their opponents while successfully being protected from conviction
by the use of disguises, secrecy, and perjury in local courts.72
Representative Stoughton also noted that the efforts to ―murder . . . leading
Republicans‖ and terrorize the black population to control the result of
elections were celebrated as victories for the Democratic Party.73
Lamenting the success of the Klan‘s tactics, Representative Stoughton
rhetorically asked how long it would be before the ―Tammany Hall
Democracy‖—the New York City Democratic organization—adopted
similar tactics to influence politics in the North.74
Representative George McKee (a Republican from Mississippi) was
adamant about the Klan‘s designs against Republicans.75 He warned about
the potential for Klan practices—murdering opponents and perjuring to
escape justice—to spread into the North as the Klan increased its influence
over the Democratic Party.76 He then described the differences between
Democratic and Republican descriptions of a killing at Meridian,
Mississippi, where—despite the differences in number—all the casualties
were Republicans.77 As in similar incidents, initial reports that black
rioting caused the violence gave way to final reports that only blacks and
Republicans were killed.78 The targeting of Republicans for Democratic
gain was a common concern among many House Republicans.79
The House also considered testimony and floor speeches about both the
Klan‘s use of violence and threats to achieve political ends, and the
strategies of Klan members to subvert the judicial system and avoid
prosecution. Representative Stoughton detailed testimony that established a
link between Democratic political figures, Klan membership, and acts of
significant amount of time speaking on Congress‘s justification for H.R. 320. See 1
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 599–608.
72. See Russell, supra note 71, at 77.
73. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at
604 (statement of Rep. Stoughton).
74. See id. at 605.
75. See id. (statement of Rep. McKee).
76. See id. at 611.
77. See id. at 612.
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., Steven F. Shatz, The Second Death of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3): The Use
and Misuse of History in Statutory Interpretation, 27 B.C. L. REV. 911, 930 (1986) (―It is
evident that the lawlessness of the South, at first undirected save by its hates, is now become
organized in the service of a political party to crush its opponents, and to drive from their
borders every friend of a Republican Administration . . . . If it was not political in the
beginning, yet as the objects of its fury, as to persons, were negroes and northern men who
had gone South . . . it has necessarily become a political engine in the hands of the
Democracy.‖ (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 443 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Benjamin Butler))); id. at 930–31 (The acts of violence are ―crimes perpetrated by concert
and agreement . . . acting with a common purpose for the injury of a certain class of citizens
entertaining certain political principles . . . . We find that this society is political in its
nature . . . and is utterly hostile to the Republican party . . . and that its victims are members
of that party‖ (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 457 (1871) (statement of Rep.
John Coburn))); see also Fockele, supra note 60, at 408–09 n.32.
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violence perpetrated to disrupt emerging political processes without fear of
legal consequence.80 When asked about the ―object‖ of the Klan, a former
Democratic state legislative candidate and Klan initiate testified that ―[t]heir
object was the overthrow of the reconstructionist policy of Congress and the
disenfranchisement of the negro.‖81 Another witness testified that members
of the Democratic Party invariably supported the Klan, with those
denouncing the Klan being the exception.82
Representative Stoughton also recounted testimony from blacks who
were visited by members of the Klan.83 One witness testified that Klan
members intimidated blacks to prevent them from voting for Republican
candidates.84 In the witness‘s experience, however, Klan members did not
block blacks from voting if they were convinced to vote for Democrats.85
The House debate included numerous examples of statements indicating
that membership in political parties or other nonracial groups were
protected by the Act.86 Supporters of the bill viewed the Klan as a political
organization that used threats and violence to obtain and maintain
Democratic control over Southern state and local governments.87 They saw

80. See Russell, supra note 71, at 77–79. Acts of intimidation and compliance with the
terms of Klan membership effectively annulled penal laws and allowed perpetrators to go
unpunished by limiting the power to arrest transgressors, engaging in the intimidation of
witnesses, and engendering an unwillingness of white juries to convict whites accused of
targeted violence or acts that obstructed prosecutions. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 456–57 (1871); see also 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 16, at 601, 603, 618; Barbiere, supra note 56, at 1225; Stephanie M. Wildman, 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3)—A Private Action to Vindicate Fourteenth Amendment Rights: A Paradox
Resolved, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 317, 322 (1980).
81. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at
601.
82. See id. at 601–02 (comments by Rep. Stoughton reading testimony given by Judge
Thomas Settle).
83. See id. at 603–04 (comments by Rep. Stoughton, recounting testimony given by
Caswell Holt, ―a poor and ignorant, but honest and conscientious negro who was twice
visited by the Ku Klux‖).
84. See id. at 604; see also Fockele, supra note 60, at 410.
85. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at
604 (comments by Rep. Stoughton, presenting testimony given by Caswell Holt); see also
Fockele, supra note 60, at 410.
86. See, e.g., David S. Schindler, Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3): A Limiting Strategy Gone Awry?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 88, 99 & n.74 (1985)
(―The proposed legislation is not intended to be partisan in its beneficent operations. It is not
to protect Republicans only in their property, liberty, and lives, but Democrats as well, not
the colored only, but the whites also; yes, even women and children, all races and all classes,
will be benefited alike, because we are simply contending for good government and
righteous laws.‖ (quoting CONG. GLOBE. 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 190 (statement of Rep.
Charles Buckley))).
87. Id. at 100; see also United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 850
n.15 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (―The Klan‘s goal was to overthrow Republican
Reconstruction policies both by terrorizing local supporters of those policies in order to
place sympathetic Democrats in office, and when that failed by supplanting the authority of
local officials directly with mob violence.‖). The Republican majority thought the primary
goal of the Klan was to remove Republicans from power in Southern state governments and
reestablish ―Democratic hegemony.‖ Fockele, supra note 60, at 409 & n.34. This included
seizing control of state governments, reversing the changes made by Reconstruction policies,

2014]

SECTION 1985(3) IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT

1043

the Act as a tool to ensure that Reconstructionist policies would continue to
impact the ―Southern political system.‖88 Although blacks were frequently
the victims of this violence, they were ―simply one symbol‖ of hated
Reconstructionist policies.89
Republican speakers identified three groups which were targeted by the
Klan: Unionists, blacks, and Northerners.90 Unionists were targeted
because of their political beliefs; blacks, because of their electoral support
for Republican Party candidates as well as their race; and Northerners, both
because of sectional animus and presumed affiliation with the Republican
Party.91 Former Klan member Thomas Willeford‘s testimony supported
this belief. He testified that at his initiation, he was told that the object of
the organization was to ―damage the Republican party as much as they
could,‖ by attacking blacks.92 In fact, to join the Klan, one had to swear to
―oppose all Radicals and negroes in all their political designs.‖93
Many have interpreted the actions of the 42nd Congress to be solely
motivated by race.94 There was, however, no dissent within the Republican
majority of the 42nd Congress that the Act targeted more than racial
violence.95 Representative Horace Maynard, for instance, said that the Act
would cover situations where a group conspires to expel ―all the northern
men, all the ‗Yankees,‘ [and] all the ‗carpetbaggers‘ from the
community.‖96 He continued that conspiracies to prevent men from voting
for the Republicans would also be covered by the statute and concluded that
he believed it was the duty of Congress to ensure that it was as safe to vote
for Republican candidates anywhere in the country as it was to vote for
Democratic candidates.97 He believed that the Klan was targeting three
groups—Northerners, Unionist Southerners, and Republicans—in addition
to blacks.98 He also indicated that H.R. 320‘s protection was not limited to
these three classes.99
and making the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments irrelevant through the use
of ―political terror.‖ Id. at 409–11.
88. See Schindler, supra note 86, at 100–01.
89. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 850 n.15.
90. See Shatz, supra note 79, at 932.
91. See id.
92. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at
603; Gormley, supra note 68, at 535 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 329
(testimony of Thomas Willeford)).
93. See Gormley, supra note 68, at 535 n.10 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 329 (1871)).
94. See infra notes 172, 191, 197, 217 and accompanying text.
95. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 562.
96. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 310 (1871).
97. Id. Some commenters have argued that—abolitionists aside—Republicans at the
time were more concerned with strengthening the party than the ―unselfish concern for the
plight of the freedmen.‖ See, e.g., Shatz, supra note 79, at 934. For example, at the height of
Reconstruction, Republicans favored black suffrage in the South where the party needed
additional votes to defeat Democrats, but opposed enfranchisement in the North where the
party‘s political power was stronger. See id. at 935.
98. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 560–61 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app.
309 (1871)).
99. See id.
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The primary objection in the House to the originally proposed language
of section 2 of H.R. 320 was its potential applicability to any ordinary
conspiracy.100 Section 2, as originally introduced, may have been broad
enough to allow for the federal prosecution of a list of criminal offenses
governed by state law, where at least two people were involved.101
Moderate and Radical Republicans disagreed over whether the enforcement
power granted by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was broad enough to
allow federal prosecution of traditionally state law offenses.102 Democrats
objected that the original language would allow for the federal prosecution
of any mere assault and battery, carrying a sentence of up to ten years
imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.103 Representative Shellabarger denied
that the statute would federalize ordinary criminal offenses, and he argued
that the list of offenses served to limit the scope of activities covered by the
statute.104 He, however, distinguished ordinary crimes from acts that
prevented others from exercising their constitutional rights and took the
position that the latter should be punishable by the federal government.105
In response to these concerns, section 2 was amended to remedy
conspiracies that deprived people of ―equal protection of the laws‖ or
enjoyment of ―equal privileges or immunities under the laws,‖ and
conspiracies to prevent states from protecting equal protection of the law.106
When the language was amended to limit application to equal protection, it
was assumed that the statute was still intended to combat Klan violence
against those identified in the preceding debate.107 Statements by
Representatives Shellabarger, Cook, and Willard, the authors and sponsors
of the amended equality language, gave no indication that they believed the
change limited application of the proposal to cases of racial animus,
continuing to present it as a remedy to discrimination against Republicans,
Unionists, Northerners, and Southerners deemed disloyal to the South.108
The amended version gained approval after Representative Shellabarger
responded to then-Representative James Garfield‘s suggestion that the bill
should be limited to private conspiracies ―aimed at particular classes of
citizens‖ of the type targeted by the Klan.109 Moderate Republicans were
concerned that the original language would reach crimes generally

100. See Gormley, supra note 68, at 537; Martin, supra note 14, at 735–36 & n.15.
101. See Gormley, supra note 68, at 537.
102. Fockele, supra note 60, at 412.
103. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at
610–11 (comments by Rep. William Arthur, noting that the offenses listed in the original
section 2 were offenses that the states punished as felonies or misdemeanors, according to
the circumstances of each offense and exclaiming ―Shades of Draco and of Jeffreys! [W]here
is the parallel to this wickedness?‖ to the assault and battery example).
104. Fockele, supra note 60, at 413 (citing CONG. GLOBE., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 382
(1871) (statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger)).
105. Id. at 413–14.
106. Act of Apr. 20, 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871), ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
107. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 563–65.
108. See id.
109. See Gormley, supra note 68, at 538.
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governed by state law, not that the statute would reach rights violations
motivated by membership in a nonracial class.110
The Senate debated on H.R. 320 from April 11 to April 14, 1871.111
Much of the Senate debate centered on the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment and a different, unadopted amendment to the proposed
statute.112 Senator George Edmunds, the floor manager of the bill,
however, did describe what he believed to be the scope of the bill. He
stated that the Act was intended to reach conspiracies formed against men
because of their political affiliation, religion, or state of origin, but not
private plots that may grow out of animosity between individuals.113
On April 20, 1871, the 42nd Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act.114
Section 1 of the final act created a cause of action against government
actors acting under the color of law, and exists to the present day, codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.115 Section 2 of the original act created a federal
criminal offense and federal civil cause of action for private conspiracies to
deprive a person of the equal protection of the law or equal enjoyment of
―privileges and immunities‖ either through direct action or by preventing
state governments from effectively safeguarding those rights.116 Much of
section 2 remains to this day in revised form as a provision for civil liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.117 Section 3 of the Act authorized the President of
the United States to use the militia or federal armed forces to quell violence
or ―insurrection‖ aimed at depriving citizens of their civil rights in a state if
the state government refuses or fails to take effective action.118 Under the
provision, the state‘s failure to defend the civil rights of its citizens is the
equivalent of state action that deprives those rights.119 Congress was
sufficiently concerned that planned campaigns of severe violence or threats
of violence in the South would replace legitimate civil authority, actually
overthrow local governments, or oppose federal authority with force,120 to

110. See id.
111. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at
620.
112. See id. at 620–50.
113. See id. at 623 (comments by Sen. George Edmunds). In a statement often quoted for
the proposition that § 1985(3) extends beyond racially motivated conspiracies, Senator
Edmumds stated while reflecting on a murder in Florida of a man killed because he was from
Vermont, that ―if in a case like this, it should appear that this conspiracy was formed against
a man because he was a Democrat . . . a Catholic, . . . a Methodist, or . . . a Vermonter, . . .
then this section could reach it.‖ Id.
114. Act of Apr. 20, 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871), ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; see Shatz,
supra note 79, at 911.
115. See § 1, 17 Stat. at 13; 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 16, at 592.
116. See § 2, 17 Stat. at 13–14.
117. 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 591;
see 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012).
118. See § 3, 17 Stat. at 14.
119. See id.
120. Fockele, supra note 60, at 405 & n.9; see § 3–4, 17 Stat. at 14–15.
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include presidential authority to declare martial law and suspend habeas
corpus in sections 3 and 4 of the Act.121
B. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence Between Enactment and Bray
During the century following the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act, the
Supreme Court rendered the broad language of the Act‘s protections
―largely impotent.‖122 In 1883, in United States v. Harris,123 the Supreme
Court held the criminal penalties of section 2 of the Act—then codified as
section 5519 of the Revised Statutes of the United States124—
unconstitutional.125 In Harris, R. G. Harris and nineteen others were
accused of conspiring to deprive four people of the right to be protected
from attack while in police custody.126 The Court found that none of the
Civil War Amendments granted Congress the authority to impose the
criminal sanctions found in section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act.127
Nearly five years later, the Court reaffirmed Harris in Baldwin v.
Franks.128 In Baldwin, Thomas Baldwin, in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, challenged his detention by U.S. Marshal C.J. Franks‘s for violating
the criminal section of the Ku Klux Klan Act.129 Franks claimed that unlike
Harris, this application of the Act was constitutional because the federal
government was obligated by treaty to protect the rights of Chinese subjects
on American soil.130 The Court held that Harris controlled and dismissed
the distinction asserted by Franks because the section of the Act struck
down in Harris was not separable from a specific section protecting foreign
nationals.131
The civil claims section of the Ku Klux Klan Act was rarely invoked
after its criminal counterpart was struck down,132 possibly because Harris
121. See § 3–4, 17 Stat. at 14–15.
122. See Schindler, supra note 86, at 89.
123. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
124. Id. at 632.
125. Id. at 644.
126. See id. at 629–32. R.G. Harris and nineteen others allegedly ―beat[], bruis[ed],
wound[ed], and otherwise ill-treat[ed]‖ four individuals who, at the time of the incident,
were being held in the custody a deputy sheriff in Crockett County, Tennessee, for some
other criminal offense. Id.
127. See id. at 641 (holding that the guarantee of equal protection under the law is broader
than the protection against involuntary servitude); id. at 638 (holding that the enforcement
authority granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits legislation to
guarantee protection from state action, but not legislation to suppress ―crime within the
states‖); id. at 637 (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment does not grant Congress the
authority to enact the Act‘s criminal penalties because (1) the Amendment does not provide
citizens with a right to vote, but only protects them from racially discriminatory deprivations
of that right and (2) the statute is not tailored to remedy voting rights violations).
128. See 120 U.S. 678, 685 (1887).
129. See id. at 679–82. Baldwin was accused of conspiring to and carrying out the forced
expulsion of a group of ―Chinese aliens‖ from the town of Nicolaus, California. Id. at 680–
82.
130. See id. at 680–81, 685–86.
131. See id. at 685–86.
132. See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 371 (1979)
(noting that, after the Court invalidated the criminal offence created by the Ku Klux Klan
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and Baldwin could be read to limit the statute to remedy violations of the
Reconstruction Amendments.133 In 1951, after nearly seventy years of
silence,134 the civil cause of action came before the Court. In Collins v.
Hardyman,135 political club members who were meeting to oppose the
Marshall Plan alleged that the defendants conspired to disrupt the club‘s
meetings,136 and that the conspiracy was actionable under what is now 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3).137 The district court dismissed the case because it found
that state action was necessary to state a claim under the statute. 138 The
Ninth Circuit reversed,139 reasoning that, if Congress had intended a state
action requirement, it would have included one similar to section 1 of the
Klan Act,140 today‘s 42 U.S.C. § 1983.141 The U.S. Supreme Court
subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit.142
The Court interpreted
§ 1985(3) to require state action in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive
equal protection of the law.143 The Court found that, absent state action
that deprived plaintiffs of legal recourse in California state courts,
defendants may have been guilty of violating local penal laws but not of
depriving the plaintiffs of equal protection of the law.144
The section ―languished in relative obscurity‖ until 1971,145 when the
Court took up Griffin v. Breckenridge.146 In Griffin, two white adults
assaulted the black passengers of a car traveling in Mississippi under the
mistaken belief that the owner of the car was working to secure civil rights
for blacks.147 The defendants drove their truck into the path of the car,
forced the passengers out of the car, prevented them from escaping, and
Act, the civil provisions remained valid but were ―rarely, if ever, invoked‖); Cogan, supra
note 64, at 532.
133. See Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 689–90 (1887); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 636–38, 641 (1883).
134. See Beth E. Hansen, Note, ―Invidiously Discriminatory Animus‖—A Class Based on
Gender and Gestation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 24
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1097, 1105 (1991).
135. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
136. Id. at 653–54. Commentators have indicated that this means the Collins Court
assumed members of political organizations were a protected class under the statute. See,
e.g., Cogan, supra note 63, at 525.
137. See Collins, 341 U.S. at 653; 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2012).
138. See Collins, 341 U.S at 656.
139. See id.
140. Hardyman v. Collins, 183 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1950).
141. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
142. See Collins, 341 U.S. at 663.
143. See id. at 661.
144. See id. The Court stated that ―[s]uch private discrimination is not inequality before
the law unless there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or
sanctuary for doing so.‖ Id. A commentator has argued that the Court‘s reading of a state
action requirement within both the criminal portion of the original statute and the civil
remedy in § 1985(3) is a result of reading the principle of federalism into the statute. See
Cogan, supra note 63, at 522–24. States were the traditional defenders of the rights of their
citizens and the Fourteenth Amendment only granted the federal government legislative
authority to ensure the states continued to fulfill this role. See id.
145. Schindler, supra note 86, at 89.
146. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
147. Id. at 90.
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threatened them with guns, while clubbing the owner of the car. 148 The
district court dismissed the complaint and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, both
relying on Collins.149 The Griffin Court overturned Collins and held that,
despite linguistic similarities between § 1985(3) and the Equal Protection
Clause, the statute contained no explicit requirement of state action.150 The
Court, like the Ninth Circuit in Collins, reasoned that, if Congress intended
a state action requirement, it would have included one like it did in § 1983,
and to read that requirement into § 1985(3) would render it redundant.151
The Court also found that § 1985(3) was intended to remedy violence by
private actors to deprive equal protection of rights.152 The Court declared
that, absent the state action requirement, the proper inquiry was whether
Congress had the power to reach the private conspiracy alleged in the given
case.153 The Court found that § 1985(3) could reach private conspiracies to
deprive a person of equal protection of the right to interstate travel.154
In reaching this holding, the Griffin Court outlined the elements for a
§ 1985(3) claim. First, a court must determine whether the alleged conduct
falls within the purview of the statute.155 A plaintiff must sufficiently
allege that (1) at least two people conspired to go in disguise on the
highway or trespass on another‘s property (2) to deprive a person or class of
persons of equal protection of, or equal privileges and immunities under the
law (3) and that at least one conspirator acted in furtherance of the
conspiracy (4) causing injury to a person or property or depriving a person
of exercising a right or privilege of a citizen of the nation.156 Second, the
trial court must examine the right violated to determine whether Congress
has the constitutional authority to regulate or prohibit the conduct alleged in
the particular case.157
Out of concern—shared by the 42nd Congress—that the statute would
become a general federal action for ―tortious, conspiratorial interferences‖
with the rights of others,158 the Court read into the equal protection
language of the statute a requirement that conspiracies must be motivated
by ―racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory

148. Id. at 90–91.
149. Id. at 92.
150. Id. at 96–97. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the Amendment‘s scope
to regulation of state actions that deprive protected rights. See United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1875). The notion of state action has expanded to include some
activities of private actors. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948) (state
enforcement of private covenants).
151. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 98–99; see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
152. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 100.
153. Id. at 104.
154. Id. at 105.
155. Fockele, supra note 60, at 406 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102–03).
156. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102–03.
157. Fockele, supra note 60, at 406 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104–07). Congress may
act against conspiracies implicating its commerce power, for the protection of ―rights of
national citizenship,‖ or pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment (deprivation of rights by
state or local government actors). See id.
158. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101; Russell, supra note 71, at 74.
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animus.‖159 This also allowed the Court to avoid the question of the
constitutionality of a federal tort statute.160 The Court found that the
plaintiffs‘ allegation of racial motivation fulfilled the class animus
requirement.161 Consequently, the Court concluded it need not define other
examples of class-based animus sufficient to state a § 1985(3) claim.162
Twenty-two years after the Griffin Court indicated that § 1985(3) may
protect members of nonracial classes,163 the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to clarify how it defined nonracial classes of persons protected
by § 1985(3), but failed to do so. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters
Local 610 v. Scott,164 the local construction trades union organized a protest
against a Texas construction company for hiring nonunion labor.165
Protesters attacked company employees and threatened to continue the
violence until all nonunion workers left town and the company changed its
hiring practices.166 The Court faced the question of whether a nonracial
group could state a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3) against a labor union
and its supporters, aimed at depriving the nonunion laborers of their free
associational right not to join a union.167 The Court echoed the conern
voiced in Griffin, that an overly expansive interpretation of § 1985(3)
would allow claims for general tortious interference with one‘s civil
rights.168 The Court held that discrimination against nonunion laborers
motivated by disapproval of their economic activities or beliefs was not
sufficient to constitute class-based animus.169 However, the Court neither
defined nonracial class-based animus, nor explicitly excluded all nonracial
class-based animus from the statute‘s protections.170
Justices on the Court disagreed over whether the legislative history of
§ 1985(3) supported a racial animus requirement.171 The majority in Scott
was convinced that the purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the Ku Klux
Klan‘s violent efforts to resist black emancipation and voting.172 In the
Court‘s view, Republicans, whites, and Northerners were subject to
violence because of their perceived sympathy for blacks, not because of any
independent hatred toward those groups.173 After acknowledging that there
159. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 102 & n.9.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 102.
164. See United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
165. See id. at 827–28.
166. Id. at 828.
167. See id. at 830, 836–38.
168. See id. at 837.
169. See id. at 838. The Court also held that there was a state action requirement for
§ 1985(3) claims where the conspirators violated a right protected by the federal government
against the states. See id. at 832–33.
170. See id. at 837–39.
171. See id. at 836–37; id. at 851–52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 836 (majority opinion) (―The central theme of the bill‘s proponents was
that the Klan and others were forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes and give them
equal access to political power.‖).
173. See id.
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is legislative history supporting a broader interpretation of legislative intent,
the Court concluded that Congress did not intend the statute to address
conspiracies motivated solely by economic animus.174 The Court elected
not to answer whether Congress intended the statute to address conspiracies
solely motivated by political affiliation because neither party presented
evidence of legislative intent not considered by the Griffin Court.175
However, the Court in dicta doubted that § 1985(3) should or was
intended to apply to purely political conspiracies.176 The majority was not
convinced that the Klan attacked Republicans in the South for any partisan
reason independent of their support for black legal and political equality.177
The Court was concerned that opening § 1985(3) to political conspiracies
would expand the statute beyond the general tort law feared by some of the
42nd Congress‘s moderate Republicans to include minor disputes over one
party heckling another.178
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed a more expansive view of the
underlying evil motivating the 42nd Congress to act.179 Justice Blackmun
was convinced that the 42nd Congress viewed Klan violence as motivated
by the political viewpoints of its victims, including a general opposition to
Reconstruction policies in the South.180 Unlike the majority opinion,181
Justice Blackmun examined a broader set of statements from the debates
prior to the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act.182 Justice Blackmun argued
that the principal difference between the radical and moderate factions of

174. See id. at 837–38. The Court concluded that carpetbaggers were not targeted in the
South because of their free labor and capital ideology but because they were either
Republicans or supporters of black suffrage. Id. at 838. The Court also quoted Senator John
Pool who argued that whenever a Northerner entered the South, the Northerner would no
longer be considered a carpetbagger if they joined or served the needs of the Democrats. See
id. at 838 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 607 (1871) (statement of Sen. Pool)).
175. See id. at 837.
176. See id. at 836 (―Although we have examined with some care the legislative history
that has been marshaled in support of the position that Congress meant to forbid wholly nonracial, but politically motivated conspiracies, we find difficult the question whether
§ 1985(3) provided a remedy for every concerted effort by one political group to nullify the
influence of or do other injury to a competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means.‖).
177. See id.
178. See id. at 837.
179. See id. at 839 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (―The Ku Klux Klan Act was the
Reconstruction Congress‘ response to politically motivated mob violence in the Postbellum
South designed to intimidate persons in the exercise of their legal rights.‖ (emphasis added)).
180. See id. at 851.
181. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 536. There was little discussion in the Scott decision of
the specific parts of the legislative history of § 1985(3) that support the contention that racial
discrimination ―was the central concern of Congress‖; the only source the Scott Court cited
for the proposition—its opinion in Griffin—made the statement without referring to a source
for support. See id. (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 835 (majority opinion)). An example of the
Scott majority not looking searchingly into the legislative history is that they seemingly
ignored the House rejection of a Senate amendment that would have provided further
protections if local government subdivisions deprived certain rights only because of the
target‘s ―race, color, or previous condition of servitude.‖ See id. at 567–68 (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871)).
182. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 841–46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the Republican Party was the scope of activity that could be reached by the
statute, not the scope of persons who may be protected by the statute.183
In 1993, the Supreme Court once more narrowed how classes protected
by § 1985(3) may be defined. In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic,184 the court excluded definitions of classes based solely on common
conduct, belief, or injury.185 In Bray, pro-life activists organized by
Operation Rescue, an unincorporated association of abortion opponents,
obstructed access to abortion clinics in the Washington, D.C. area and, on at
least one occasion, forced a clinic to close for more than six hours.186 Nine
abortion clinics and five women‘s rights groups brought a § 1985(3) claim
against Operation Rescue and six protestors for conspiring to infringe upon
the right to practice and have access to abortions.187 The Court
distinguished the potential class of women from a class of women who
support abortion rights or seek abortions.188 The Court concluded that the
latter could not be protected by § 1985(3), because to allow classes defined
by the ―desire to engage in conduct that the [] defendant disfavors‖ would
expand § 1985(3) into a general tort law.189
C. The Circuit Court Divide on Racial Animus Requirement
The Supreme Court‘s refusal to decide whether to apply the racial animus
requirement to political conspiracies under § 1985(3) left the circuit courts
to determine whether to apply the requirement. Part I.C.1 presents the
majority position among the circuits: racial animus is a required element of
politically motivated conspiracy claims. Part I.C.2 presents the minority
position: Section 1985(3) was intended to apply to discrimination
motivated exclusively by political party animus. Part I.C.3 briefly
introduces the potentially inconsistent holdings in the Second Circuit from
before and after Scott.
1. Majority: Racial Animus Is Required for Political Conspiracies
Though the Supreme Court withheld judgment on whether Congress
intended a racial animus requirement for § 1985(3) conspiracy claims,190
eight of the eleven circuits deciding the issue were convinced by either

183. See id. at 842–43.
184. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
185. Id. at 269–70.
186. See id. at 266, 284.
187. See id. at 266; Nat‘l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1487
(E.D. Va. 1989) aff’d, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990) judgment rev’d in part, vacated in part
sub nom. Bray, 506 U.S. 263.
188. See id. The Court found that it need not decide whether women as a class were
protected by § 1985(3) because the acts alleged in the case were motivated either by the
defendants‘ opposition to abortions or defendants‘ desire to save unborn children, not by the
plaintiffs‘ gender itself. Id. at 269–70.
189. See id. at 269–71.
190. See supra notes 170, 175 and accompanying text.
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Griffin or the Scott dicta to impose such a requirement.191 Within two years
of the Scott decision, three circuits concluded that a person claiming that
they were discriminated against because of their political affiliation must
assert some racial motivation to sustain a claim pursuant to § 1985(3).
In Harrison v. KVAT Food Management, Inc.,192 the Fourth Circuit
adopted the view of the majority in Scott that the Ku Klux Klan Act was a
response to racially motivated violence.193 James Harrison, an employee of
KVAT Food Management, claimed that he was fired from his job because
he announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination for countywide
office.194 Harrison contended that other employees were permitted to run
for office as Democrats without being fired.195 The Fourth Circuit was
convinced by the Scott dicta that the 42nd Congress‘s primary concern was
combatting violent efforts to block implementation of the Civil War
Amendments.196 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that, absent further
evidence of congressional intent, the court should not extend the scope of
§ 1985(3) to any class not approved by the Supreme Court.197
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit requires racial animus as an element of
§ 1985(3) conspiracy claims.198
In Brown v. Reardon,199 the Tenth Circuit held that politically motivated
§ 1985(3) claims must have a racial component.200 Brown was a
consolidation of four cases against Kansas City, Kansas, and a number of
city officials.201 In Brown, four city employees were laid off after refusing
to purchase tickets to their employers‘ political fundraiser or make
contributions to their employers‘ political organization.202 The plaintiffs
191. See, e.g., Perez-Sanchez v. Pub. Bldg. Auth., 531 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 2008) (―We
find the Supreme Court‘s dicta in Scott and the reasoning of our sister circuits persuasive.
Recognizing a claim under § 1985(3) for discrimination due to political affiliation would
open the federal courts to a wide variety of claims, ranging from employment disputes such
as this one to election-related claims. We thus decline to extend § 1985(3)‘s protection to
political affiliation.‖); Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2006) (―As to
both groups, however, the invidiously discriminatory animus behind the Klan‘s actions was
motivated by racial hatred, not by its victims‘ political party affiliation.‖); Grimes v. Smith,
776 F.2d 1359, 1366 (7th Cir. 1985) (―The import of both Griffin and Scott is that the
legislative history of § 1985(3) does not support extending the statute to include conspiracies
other than those motivated by a racial, class-based animus against ‗Negroes and their
supporters.‘‖); Brown v. Reardon, 770 F.2d 896, 905 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting class
definitions broader than ―race, sex, religion, or national origin‖); Harrison v. KVAT Food
Mgmt., Inc., 766 F.2d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 1985) (―In analyzing the Scott decision, we find
little support for the contention that § 1985(3) includes in its scope of protection the victims
of purely political conspiracies.‖).
192. 766 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1985).
193. See id. at 157 (―The passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act was in response to widespread
violence and acts of terror directed at blacks and their supporters in the postwar South.‖).
194. Id. at 156.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 162.
197. See id. at 161.
198. See id.
199. 770 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1985).
200. See id. at 907.
201. Id. at 897.
202. Id.
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claimed that they were terminated because of their membership in a class
defined by opposition to the political activities of their employers.203 The
Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the class-based animus
requirement from Griffin and Scott.204 The court read Scott and Griffin to
require racial animus to prevent the statute from becoming a general tort
law.205 In light of Scott, the Tenth Circuit concluded that ―[t]he
statute . . . was intended . . . to provide redress for victims of conspiracies
impelled by a commingling of racial and political motives.‖206
In Grimes v. Smith,207 the Seventh Circuit went further and held that
§ 1985(3) only remedies conspiracies based on racial, class-based
animus.208 In Grimes, Doug Grimes and two voters claimed that a number
of individuals conspired to mislead voters to prevent him from winning the
Democratic Primary for City Judge by placing a person with a name similar
to Grimes on the ballot.209 Grimes claimed that the conspiracy deprived
him of the right of meaningful participation in electoral politics.210 The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that to interpret § 1985(3) so broadly would
require courts to determine the outcome of elections, determine whether a
candidate is a serious candidate or not, and face cases of ―gardenvariety . . . vote fraud,‖ which neither the federal courts nor § 1985(3) are
equipped to address.211 Based on the Scott analysis of legislative history,
the Seventh Circuit held that § 1985(3) is limited to conspiracies motivated
by racial animus.212
More recently, the Third Circuit decided Farber v. City of Paterson.213
Roberta Farber was an administrative employee whose employment may
have been subject to the city‘s collective bargaining agreement with the
local public employees union.214 The Third Circuit addressed the question
of whether the violence that prompted the Ku Klux Klan Act was racially
motivated or politically motivated.215 The court discounted the political
motivations of Klan violence, including blocking carpetbaggers from
profiting off of the economic condition of the South and the general disdain

203. See id. at 905.
204. See id. at 905–06. The Tenth Circuit had interpreted Griffin to require that class
animus be based on race, gender, religion, or national origin. See id. at 905.
205. See id. at 906.
206. Id. at 907 (emphasis added) (quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 (7th
Cir. 1979)).
207. 776 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1985).
208. See id. at 1366.
209. See id. at 1360–63.
210. See id. at 1363.
211. See id. at 1367.
212. See id. at 1366. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the intent of Congress was to
remedy violence against blacks and against those targeted because of their support for
blacks. Id.
213. 440 F.3d 131 (3rd Cir. 2006).
214. See id. at 133. The court commented that this case appeared to be one of political
patronage, where the newly elected Democratic mayor fired city employees who supported
the former Republican incumbent. Id. at 132–33.
215. Id. at 134–35.

1054

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

for Republicans.216 As a result, the court concluded that the targeting of
members of those groups was incidental to the Klan‘s targeting of blacks
and their perceived allies.217 The court also concluded that political animus
was insufficiently ―invidious‖ to support a § 1985(3) claim.218
The common thread in these cases is the circuit courts‘ reliance on the
Scott Court‘s examination and interpretation of § 1985(3)‘s legislative
history—an inquiry concentrated on whether Congress intended to address
economic class-based animus.
2. Minority Position: Political Affiliation Animus
Is Individually Recognized
Two circuit courts maintained their pre-Scott holdings that animosity
toward a person‘s political affiliation or association was sufficient to fulfill
the intent requirement of § 1985(3). The Sixth Circuit continued to hold
that the racial animus requirement is not included in the statute and, absent
clear Supreme Court precedent requiring racial animus, the Sixth Circuit is
bound by its own precedent.219 The Fifth Circuit also held that classes
characterized by their ―political beliefs or associations‖ are protected under
§ 1985(3).220 The Fifth Circuit found that Congress intended to protect
those all of those targeted by the Ku Klux Klan including whites, who were
targeted because of their political beliefs or affiliation with a political
party.221
The Sixth Circuit maintained its pre-Scott position that political
affiliation is a class protected by § 1985(3). In Cameron v. Brock,222
opponents to the election of the sitting sheriff claimed that the defendants
destroyed their political pamphlets under an implicit threat of arrest and
arrested other members of the sheriff‘s opposition while passing out
flyers.223 The court rejected the racial animus requirement for three
reasons: (1) Section 1985(3) does not state a racial discrimination
requirement; (2) the Supreme Court in Griffin declined to rule on whether
nonracial discrimination was covered; and (3) the Court in Snowden v.
Hughes224 indicated that conspiracies motivated by animus against
nonracial groups may be actionable.225 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit
followed its own precedent and accepted nonracial discrimination as
sufficient to meet the animus requirement in Griffin.226
216. See id. at 140–41.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 138.
219. See Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 1987); Cameron v. Brock, 473
F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973).
220. See McLean v. Int‘l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980)).
221. See Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 1981).
222. 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973).
223. Id. at 609.
224. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
225. See Cameron, 473 F.2d at 610.
226. See id.
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In Conklin v. Lovely,227 an employee of both the County Clerk and
County Treasurer, each Republicans, brought a § 1985(3) claim alleging
that she was terminated from her position because of her support for the
incumbent Democrat County Prosecuting Attorney against a Republican
challenger.228 The Sixth Circuit narrowly read Scott to only exclude
economic affinity or interest groups from the protection of § 1985(3).229
Because the Supreme Court came to no clear holding regarding the racial
animus requirement and political party–based discrimination, the Sixth
Circuit held that it was required to follow its own precedent, permitting
claims by purely political groups.230
In McLean v. International Harvester Co.,231 the Fifth Circuit maintained
the validity of political affiliation–motivated conspiracy claims under
§ 1985(3).232 In McLean, George McLean claimed he was in a class of
employees scapegoated in a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigation
into both him and his employer.233 The Fifth Circuit‘s position on
§ 1985(3) is that it protects against conspiracies motivated by animus
against racial groups, groups defined by other immutable characteristics,
and groups defined by common political ideology.234
The court
acknowledged the Scott dicta‘s concern about the scope of the statute
beyond race-based claims but continued to apply the circuit‘s pre-Scott
test.235 Applying the test, the court dismissed the claim because plea
bargain scapegoats did not fall into a protected category.236
3. The Second Circuit Is Unsettled After Scott
In light of the Scott dicta, the Second Circuit shifted its interpretation of
§ 1985(3) but left its district courts without clear guidance to follow
regarding political conspiracies. Before the Scott decision, the Second
Circuit in Keating v. Carey237 held that political affiliation was a class
protected by § 1985(3).238 After Scott, the Second Circuit in Gleason v.
227. 834 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1987).
228. See id. at 544–45.
229. See id. at 548–49. The Sixth Circuit held that the Scott Court limited its own holding
to economic animus in the Court‘s dicta, which indicated its holding would not change if
§ 1985(3) covered political animus–motivated conspiracies. Id. at 549.
230. See id. For a broader discussion of the Sixth Circuit‘s balance between Scott and its
own pre-Scott precedent, see generally Martin, supra note 14.
231. 817 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987).
232. See id. at 1219 (citing Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir.
1980)).
233. See id. at 1218.
234. See id. at 1219 (citing Kimble, 623 F.2d at 1066). The court stated two categories
that the circuit recognized: ―those characterized by ‗political beliefs or associations‘‖ and
―those characterized by ‗some inherited or immutable characteristic.‘‖ Id. (quoting Kimble,
623 F.2d at 1066). Though race is among the ―inherited or immutable characteristic[s]‖
mentioned in McLean, this Note separates race as a category for easier comparison with
cases that limit class-based animus to exclusively racial animus.
235. See id. at 1218–19.
236. See id. at 1219.
237. 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983).
238. See id. at 387.
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McBride239 called the continued viability of Keating into question because
of the Scott Court‘s interpretation § 1985(3)‘s legislative history.240 The
court refrained from deciding the question because it was unnecessary to
resolve the case.241 Part II examines Keating and Gleason in greater detail.
II. SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS CAUSE DISTRICT COURT CONFUSION
The Second Circuit‘s inability to address the question of politically
motivated conspiracies—left open by Scott—has led to a split among the
district courts of the Second Circuit that is remarkably similar to the
national circuit split. Part II.A discusses the Second Circuit‘s recognition of
political animus–based § 1985(3) claims before Scott. Part II.B examines
the Second Circuit‘s narrowed scope of actionable § 1985(3) clams in light
of the dicta in Scott. Part II.C explores the district courts‘ divergent
attempts to reconcile Second Circuit precedent applicable to § 1985(3)
claims brought against members of politically motivated conspiracies.
A. Before Scott: The Second Circuit Recognizes Political Animus
Before Scott, the Second Circuit unambiguously recognized the
applicability of § 1985(3) to conspiracies motivated solely by political
affiliation.242 In Keating v. Carey—decided the same year as, but without
the benefit of, Scott—Robert Keating was one of nine employees chosen to
run the office now known as the Division of Criminal Justice Services.243
Keating‘s background as a journalist covering law enforcement qualified
him to be an Associate Public Information Specialist for the division.244
When Keating took the job, he was told that the position came with
protections equivalent to tenured competitive civil servants.245 After
Democratic Governor Hugh Carey was elected, Keating was told that he
was to be terminated because of his Republican Party affiliation.246
Keating brought claims under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986.247
Keating based his § 1985(3) claim on his political affiliation–motivated
termination, and an alleged conspiracy to both hide his legally enforceable
tenure rights from him and deter him from bringing suit in federal court.248
The district court, in a footnote, dismissed Keating‘s § 1985(3) claim
because he failed to allege defendants motive was class based.249

239. 869 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
240. See id. at 695.
241. See id.
242. See Keating, 706 F.2d at 387.
243. Id. at 380.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 379–80.
248. Id. at 380. Keating claimed that the defendants alternatively threatened to bring up
fabricated charges against him if he brought suit and promised replacement employment for
Keating‘s silence. Id.
249. Id. at 381.
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The Second Circuit held that discrimination motivated by membership in
the Republican Party was actionable under § 1985(3).250 Based on the
extensive references to Klan violence against Republicans in the statute‘s
legislative history,251 the court found the exclusion of political affiliation–
based discrimination from statutory protection to be indefensible.252
According to the court, Congress saw the Ku Klux Klan not ―solely as a
racist organization . . . but as a political organization intent on establishing
Democratic hegemony in the South,‖ by attacking blacks, carpetbaggers
and Southern ―men of union sentiment.‖253
The court was critical of Judge Meskill‘s dissenting argument that the
statute was limited to race-based conspiracies because Klan attacks on
Republicans were racially motivated.254 Judge Meskill argued that the Klan
only attacked Republicans because they supported equal legal rights for
blacks, including suffrage.255 The majority concluded that this ignored the
historical context of the South‘s nonracial resentment against Northern
occupation and exploitation of the South.256
B. After Scott: The Gleason Dicta Indicates a Limiting of Scope
In Gleason v. McBride,257 decided five years after Scott, the Second
Circuit was more circumspect about whether § 1985(3) protected victims of
purely political conflicts. In light of Scott, the Second Circuit signaled a
narrowing of what it would recognize as actionable class-based
discrimination, leaving unclear whether the circuit would continue to
recognize political party class-based animus.
Gleason concerned a conspiracy motivated by the claimant‘s political
opposition to the mayor of the Village of Mount Kisko.258 Thomas Gleason
claimed that he was targeted for arrest and conviction for the harassment of
a village teenager, because he challenged the sitting village mayor for
reelection as an independent candidate.259 The district court found that
opposition to a candidate for office as a political independent could not
define a class protected by § 1985(3).260 In affirming, the circuit court
examined how the Scott decision impacted its own holding in Keating.261
While finding that Gleason, as a political independent, failed to claim that
he was targeted because of his political affiliation, the Gleason court noted

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See id. at 387.
See supra Part I.A.
See Keating, 706 F.2d at 387.
Id.
See id. at 387 n.17.
See id. at 393–94 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
See id. at 387 n.17 (majority opinion); see also supra Part I.A.
869 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
See id. at 690–91, 694.
See id. at 690–91.
See Gleason v. McBride, 715 F. Supp. 59, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
See Gleason, 869 F.2d at 694–95.
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that § 1985(3) might no longer extend to discrimination against political
groups absent racial motivation.262
But, just as the Supreme Court left the question open in Scott, the Second
Circuit did not decide whether partisan animus against a member of another
political party was sufficient to state a § 1985(3) claim. The court found no
need to address the issue further because Gleason (1) did not claim to be a
member of a political party and (2) claimed to have been discriminated
against because of his individual actions rather than class-based animus.263
Though the Second Circuit has yet to readdress political affiliation–based
conspiracies, the Second Circuit has consistently held that that political or
shared ideology–based conspiracies, absent race or political affiliation, are
not actionable under § 1985(3).264
C. District Courts Split on Applying Keating and Gleason
The district courts within the Second Circuit have taken two approaches
over whether to impose a racial animus requirement on § 1985(3) political
conspiracies after the Gleason court‘s dicta called Keating‘s validity into
doubt. Part II.C.1 explores cases from the Eastern and Northern Districts of
New York, which continue to follow Keating. Part II.C.2 discusses cases in
the Southern and Western Districts of New York, which have articulated a
narrower scope of § 1985(3) in light of Gleason and Scott. Part II.C.3
explores District of Connecticut cases which, although they do not involve
claims of purely political animus, lean toward Keating.
1. Approach One: Racial Animus Required
Absent Political Party Animus
Judges in the Eastern and Northern Districts of New York have attempted
to reconcile the holdings of Gleason and Keating. In these districts,
plaintiffs need not meet the racial animus requirement for claims involving
political affiliation class–based conspiracies, but must satisfy the

262. See id. at 695 (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,
836–37 (1983)).
263. See id. The court further noted that it agreed with a portion of Justice Blackmun‘s
dissent in Scott, where he stated that ―the intended victims [of discrimination] must be
victims not because of any personal malice the conspirators have toward them, but because
of their membership in or affiliation with a particular class.‖ Id. (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at
850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). This is consistent with the Supreme Court‘s later holding in
Bray that a class or class-based animus could not be defined by opposition to abortion. See
supra notes 185–89 and accompanying text.
264. See Arteta v. County of Orange, 141 F. App‘x 3, 8 (2d Cir. 2005) (refusing to
recognize political opponents as a class); Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir.
1996) (applying Scott to reject § 1985(3) claim that defendants ―discriminated against [the
plaintiff] because of his leadership role in protesting the change in work conditions‖). Arteta
was another case where government employees alleged that an elected official caused them
injury because they opposed his election. Arteta, 141 F. App‘x at 8. The court did not
mention Keating or address the Gleason dicta calling Keating into question, but held that
Gleason applied because the plaintiffs did not claim party affiliation as a motivating factor.
See id.
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requirement for claims involving class-based animus defined by political
opposition to a candidate, governmental action, policy, or issue.
In Platsky v. Kilpatrick,265 Judge Glasser in the Eastern District found
that Keating and Gleason could be reconciled, preserving both as good
law.266 In Platsky, Henry Platsky claimed that he suffered harassment,
intimidation, false arrest, and eviction because he was an avowed Socialist
who belonged to a number of Socialist organizations.267 The court chose
not to decide the viability of Keating because it found insufficient evidence
linking any animus to the defendants‘ actions.268
However, Judge Glasser, assuming Keating remained good law after
Scott and Gleason, identified plausible interpretations of the two cases so
that Gleason would not overrule Keating.269 The court read Keating to hold
that political animus, like racial animus, could fulfill the class and intent
requirements of § 1985(3).270 The court then read Gleason to exclude
claims based on opposing political views, support or opposition for a
candidate, or opposition to governmental policies.271 Following this
approach, Gleason limits actionable political animus to animus based on
one‘s political party affiliation.272
In 2011, the Eastern District in Fishman v. County of Nassau273
continued to apply Keating to § 1985(3) conspiracy claims.274 Alan
Fishman claimed that he was dismissed from his position as Special
Assistant to the Clerk of the Legislature for the newly Republicancontrolled Nassau County legislature because he was a Democratic County
Committee member.275 Special Assistant to the Clerk of the Legislature is
a bipartisan position serving both party caucuses with no political affiliation
requirement.276 The court held that, because the warnings in both Scott and
Gleason were dicta, Keating‘s rejection of a racial requirement for political
party–motivated conspiracies remained good law.277
Even as recently as this year, Eastern District of New York opinions
acknowledged that the Second Circuit has not clearly decided whether
discrimination based on political party membership qualifies as class-based
animus.278
265. 806 F. Supp. 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
266. See id. at 362–63.
267. See id. at 359–60, 363.
268. Id. at 363.
269. See id. at 362–63.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. No. 10 CV 3231(DRH)(AKT), 2011 WL 3919713 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2011).
274. See id. at *9.
275. See id. at *2.
276. See id. at *1.
277. See id. at *9.
278. See, e.g., Frasco v. Mastic Beach Prop. Owners‘ Ass‘n, No. 12-CV-2756
(JFB)(WDW), 2014 WL 3735870, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2014) (dismissing § 1985(3)
claim based on class defined by support for village incorporation); Fotopolous v. Bd. of Fire
Comm‘rs of Hicksville Fire Dist., No. 11-CV-5532(MKB), 2014 WL 1315241, at *17
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (―Although it is unclear whether under Second Circuit law a
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The Northern District of New York similarly distinguishes claims of
conspiracies motivated by shared political ideals or positions from
conspiracies motivated by political party membership. In Barber v.
Winn,279 the Northern District of New York interpreted Gleason narrowly
to exclude prospective classes defined by ―political or philosophical
opposition‖ to a candidate or political issue.280 In Barber, plaintiffs Robert
Barber and William L. Nikas alleged that Washington County District
Attorney Robert Winn and other county officials conspired to maliciously
prosecute Barber and Nikas for bribery, conspiracy, fraud, and conflict of
interest, in an effort to avoid the political and economic consequences of a
county construction contract.281 In their § 1985(3) claim, the plaintiffs
argued that they were conspired against because they were members of a
group which ―actively and rigorously endorsed and promoted‖ the
construction project.282 Consistent with the distinction recognized in the
Eastern District, the court held that shared political support or opposition to
a political issue cannot define a class of individuals protected by
§ 1985(3).283
The Northern District of New York also follows Keating‘s holding that
animus against a person motivated by their membership in a political party
can sustain a § 1985(3) claim. In Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Town of
Rochester,284 members of Citizens Accord, a not-for-profit group, alleged
that certain town actions violated their Equal Protection rights.285 The town
acquiesced to operations at Accord Speedway in violation of noise
variances, altered procedures concerning testimony at hearings on the topic,
and changed the monitoring of noise levels to benefit the speedway.286 The
court voiced doubts about the viability of the Keating holding but
concluded that, until the case was overturned, Keating was still binding
authority.287 Applying Keating, the court concluded that membership in
Citizens Accord was insufficient to sustain a § 1985(3) claim.288 Citizens
Accord was organized as a not-for-profit corporation to promote local
―socially responsible land use control.‖289 The court found that it was not a
political party is a protected group satisfying § 1985‘s class-based discrimination
requirement, the Second Circuit has clearly stated that a plaintiff who claims discrimination
because he or she stood ‗in political and philosophical opposition to the defendants‘ and
were ‗outspoken in their criticism of the defendants‘ political and governmental attitudes and
activities do not constitute a cognizable class under Section 1985.‘‖ (quoting Gleason v.
McBride, 869 F.2d 688, 695 (2d Cir. 1989))).
279. No. 95-CV-1030(FJS), 1997 WL 151999 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997) aff’d, 131 F.3d
130 (2d Cir. 1997).
280. See id. at *10 (quoting Gleason, 869 F.2d at 695).
281. See id. at *1.
282. Id. at *10.
283. See id.; supra Part II.C.1.
284. Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Town of Rochester, No. 98-CV-0715, 2000 WL 504132
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2000) aff’d, 29 F. App‘x 767 (2d Cir. 2002).
285. Id. at *5.
286. Id. at *1.
287. See id. at *8.
288. See id. at *9.
289. See id.
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political organization.290 ―The fact that a group bands together to voice
opposition to conduct of another does not, in and of itself, place this group
within a class protected by § 1985(3).‖291
2. Approach Two: Gleason Requires Racial Class-Based Animus
The second approach taken by district courts to remedy the confusion
caused by Gleason is to follow the admonitions in the Gleason dicta and
impose a racial animus requirement. The Western District of New York
and the Southern District of New York, like a majority of the federal district
courts, have articulated racial animus requirements on purely political
§ 1985(3) conspiracy claims.292
In 1998, the Western District heard Adamczyk v. City of Buffalo,293 a case
involving the violation of a plaintiff‘s Fourteenth Amendment and other
statutory rights for political gain.294 Plaintiff Lawrence Adamczyk accused
someone in the Buffalo police department of anonymously faxing a police
report from a drunk driving arrest, which recorded Adamczyk admitting to
taking AZT for HIV, with a cover letter warning voters of Adamczyk‘s HIV
status.295 The report was released when Adamczyk was the Campaign
Manager of Erie County Executive Dennis Gorski‘s reelection campaign.296
It was clear to the court that the leak was intended to give Gorski‘s
opponents an advantage in the election.297 However, the court dismissed
Adamczyk‘s § 1985(3) claims, in part because he failed to demonstrate that
he was a member of a protected class and that a conspiracy was motivated
by such membership.298
In Juncewicz v. Patton299—decided four years later and citing
Adamczyk—the court held that political affiliation alone does not satisfy the
animus or protected group membership requirements of a § 1985(3)
claim.300 In Juncewicz, Annette Juncewicz was appointed to and held a
290. See id.
291. Id. at *8.
292. See Lederman v. Giuliani, No. 98 CIV.2024LMM/JCF, 2007 WL 1623103, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2007); Juncewicz v. Patton, No. 01-CV-0519E(SR), 2002 WL 31654957,
at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2002); supra Part I.C.1.
293. See No. 95-CV-1023E(H), 1998 WL 89342 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1998).
294. See id. at *2, *6–7.
295. See id. at *1–2.
Dear Voter,
We are bombarded with facts and half-truths in the County Executive race. One
concrete fact we all must know is that Gorski‘s campaign manager, Larry
Adamczyk[,] is infected with AIDS and is HIV+. All voters should know the
people around Gorski are not normal people and these people will be running
county affairs with Gorski the next 4 years. (Adamczyk[‘s] last arrest and
cellblock sheet are attached for proof).
Id. at *2.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id. at *6.
299. See Juncewicz v. Patton, No. 01-CV-0519E(SR), 2002 WL 31654957 (W.D.N.Y.
Oct. 8, 2002).
300. See id. at *3.
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competitive civil service position with the county water authority over the
opposition of the chairman of the county Democratic Party.301 Juncewicz‘s
position was eliminated from the authority‘s budget a year later.302
Juncewicz brought a § 1985(3) claim alleging that her position was
eliminated as retribution against her husband, a Democratic county
legislator, who supported a faction in the Democratic Party opposed to its
chairman.303 Citing Adamczyk, the court dismissed the claim because
political affiliation or association does not fulfill the class membership or
animus requirements of § 1985(3).304
In Fulani v. McAuliffe,305 the Southern District also parted with the
Eastern and Northern Districts‘ application of Gleason, opting for a
narrower interpretation of invidious class-based animus that excluded
animus against a political party as a motivation that could support a claim
under § 1985(3).306 In Fulani, a group of political independents accused
Democratic officials of conspiring to violate their rights to vote and freely
associate by trying to keep Ralph Nader‘s name off the ballot in a number
of states during the 2004 presidential election.307 Despite the opportunity to
limit the court‘s holding to the shared political belief reasoning—
recognized by the entire circuit308—the court stated that, ―[m]ore
importantly,‖ political affiliation was not recognized by the Supreme Court
or the Second Circuit as a class definition protected by § 1985(3).309 Judge
Preska appears to have interpreted the class-based animus requirement as
narrowly as the majority of circuit courts.310
Two years later, another judge in the Southern District of New York did
not impose a racial animus requirement on a political party–based claim. In
Lederman v. Giuliani,311 Robert Lederman was a member of a group of
street artists who advocated for greater First Amendment rights for street
artists.312 The defendants, two court officers, knew Lederman for his
leafleting near the courthouse.313 Lederman brought a § 1985(3) action
claiming that the two court officers led him out of court on the pretext of
searching for a weapon or recording device and assaulted him.314
Lederman claimed that the attack was motivated by his political activity and
301. See id. at *1.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id. at *3.
305. See No. 04 Civ. 6973(LAP), 2005 WL 2276881 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2005).
306. See id. at *6.
307. Id. at *1.
308. See id. at *6 (―Class-based discrimination against these seven Plaintiffs would seem
to be made rather difficult, if not impossible, as these Plaintiffs themselves refuse to be
politically classified.‖).
309. See id.
310. Compare id., with supra Part II.C.1. (recognizing the similarity between Judge
Preska‘s interpretation of Gleason with the majority of circuit courts‘ interpretations of
Scott).
311. No. 98 Civ.2024LMM/JCF, 2007 WL 1623103 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2007).
312. Id. at *1.
313. Id.
314. Id. at *5.
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affiliation with the street artists‘ First Amendment group.315 Consistent
with Second Circuit precedent, the court acknowledged that groups of
individuals with shared political beliefs or a shared opposition to policy or
government actions were not protected against injury from conspiracies
under § 1985(3).316 The court however denied summary judgment because
it found a question of fact as to whether the artists‘ group was a political
organization.317
Most recently, in 2014, however, a judge in the Southern District again
articulated the narrower interpretation of class-based animus. In Dolan v.
Connolly,318 an inmate, Rory Dolan, claimed that he was targeted by
corrections personnel while incarcerated—both at Fishkill Correctional
Facility and Cayuga Correctional Facility—because he often gave legal
advice to inmates and aided them in complaints made to the Department of
Corrections about facility conditions and staff conduct.319 The court
dismissed Dolan‘s § 1985(3) claim because he did not argue that his
treatment was motivated by racial or other class-based animus.320 The
court limited class-based animus to animus against ―those groups with
discrete and immutable characteristics such as race, national origin, and
sex.‖321 In any event, the Southern District has not held that animus
motivated by political party can constitute the animus required to sustain
§ 1985(3) claims under Scott.
3. Two Districts Have Not Directly Decided the Issue
The Districts of Connecticut and Vermont do not appear to have
addressed the racial animus requirement to political party based
conspiracies. However, in one recent decision, a judge in the District of
Connecticut indicated that classes and class-based animus may exist in
categories other than those defined by race.322 Furthermore, at least two
315. Id.
316. See id. (―[T]hose who are in political and philosophical opposition to [the
defendants], and who are, in addition, outspoken in their criticism of the [defendants‘]
political and governmental attitudes and activities‘ do not constitute a cognizable class under
Section 1985.‖ (quoting Gleason v. McBride, 869 F.2d 688, 695 (2d Cir. 1989)).
317. Id. The Lederman court seemingly distinguished between Keating and Gleason after
the Second Circuit may have hinted at such a distinction in an unpublished decision. See id.;
Arteta v. County of Orange, 141 F. App‘x 3, 8 (2d Cir. 2005). However, it is unlikely that
the Leaderman court relied on Arteta because Lederman only cites to Gleason and not
Arteta. See generally Lederman, 2007 WL 1623103.
318. No. 13 Civ. 5726(GBD)(GWG), 2014 WL 1876524 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014), report
and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 3057973 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2014).
319. Id. at *1.
320. Id. at *12.
321. Id. (quoting Vega v. Artus, 610 F. Supp. 2d 185, 204 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)).
322. See Orr v. Wisner, No. 3:08-CV-953(JCH), 2010 WL 2667918, at *9 (D. Conn. June
29, 2010). After concluding that plaintiffs did not claim a conspiracy motivated by racial
animus, the court stated that it ―must consider whether there is evidence of a conspiracy
motivated by animus that is ‗otherwise class-based.‘ . . . [A] federal court must consider
whether the ‗class‘ at issue in fact constitutes a ‗class,‘ rather than merely a group of
individuals ‗seeking to engage in the activity the defendant has interfered with.‘‖ Id.
(quoting Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 991 F.2d 1039, 1046 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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District of Connecticut cases cited Keating to list political affiliation as one
of many nonracial classes that fall within the gamut of § 1985(3).323
Additionally, the District of Connecticut is in agreement with the other
districts in the circuit in refusing to find classes defined by a shared position
on an issue to be protected by § 1985(3).324
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT SHOULD RECOGNIZE
POLITICAL ANIMUS FOR § 1985(3) CONSPIRACIES
The Second Circuit should resolve the confusion among its district courts
by adopting the reconciliation of Keating and Gleason articulated by Judge
Glasser of the Eastern District of New York in Platsky v. Kilpatrick. Judge
Glasser interpreted § 1985(3) to address political party animus absent racial
animus, while excluding classes defined by shared political belief or
common political activity.325 Part III.A argues that both the history of the
Reconstruction South and the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act
indicate Congress‘s intent to cover politically motivated conspiracies. Part
III.B discusses how recognition of political party–motivated conspiracies is
consistent with Scott and Bray. Part III.C explains that the Second Circuit
can reconcile Keating and Gleason by recognizing political party–
motivated animus. Part III.D applies the proposed rule to the district court
cases discussed in Part II.C.
A. The Racial Animus Requirement Is Inconsistent
with Legislative and Social History
The social history of the Reconstruction South and legislative history of
the Ku Klux Klan Act do not support a racial animus requirement on
§ 1985(3) claims against political conspiracies. Both the Ku Klux Klan Act
and the violence it was intended to address took place in the context of
economic and political instability in the South.326 The economy was
devastated and new governments were being formed without the
participation or recognition of the former political and social elite.327 In a
society where violence was a common tool to enforce social norms,328 it is
far too simplistic to view Klan violence as exclusively racially motivated.
The Klan of the Reconstruction South may be characterized more
accurately as a counterrevolutionary militant force, attempting to reverse
Reconstruction and restore the South‘s Antebellum Democratic political
leadership to power.329 White legal and social supremacy was a component
323. Nixon v. Blumenthal, No. CIV 3:08CV1933 (JBA), 2010 WL 918091, at *6 n.3 (D.
Conn. Mar. 11, 2010), aff’d, 409 F. App‘x 391 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Orr, 2010 WL
2667918, at *9.
324. Mahoney v. Nat‘l Org. for Women, 681 F. Supp. 129, 135 (D. Conn. 1987); see
supra notes 271, 283, 290, 298, 316 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 269–72 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 31–35, 40–45 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 31–35, 40–45 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 49.
329. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
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of the antebellum South that the Klan was trying to restore.330 But the
principal goal of the movement was the restoration of Democratic control of
local politics and the local economy.331 As the statute was enacted to
combat Klan violence, it is unlikely that Congress would limit its
applicability to only one aspect of what motivated that violence.
Indeed, the legislative history of the Act is replete with floor speeches
and committee reports that indicate that the Republican majority in
Congress was motivated by more than racial discrimination. Legislative
committees were tasked with discovering whether bands of a ―political
character‖ were waging a campaign of violence.332 A Senate report
concluded that the Klan carried out its violence—against blacks, Northern
Republicans and Southern Republicans—with the goal of restoring white
Democratic rule.333
Congress filled volumes of the legislative record with floor speeches,
including excerpts of testimony given in committee, about the scope of
Klan violence beyond its racial motivations. Representative William
Stoughton, one of the primary supporters of the Act in the House,
expounded on the political motivation to Klan violence by highlighting the
relationship between Klan membership and the Democratic Party, the
murders of leading Republicans, and the use of terrorism against blacks to
ensure Democratic victory at the polls.334 Other legislators in the
Republican majority echoed this sentiment, and in various ways, expressed
their understanding that Klan violence was political violence targeting
Republicans.335 Committee testimony from Klan members stated that
Democrats invariably supported the Klan, and that the Klan‘s self-described
purposes were the overthrow of Reconstructionist policies (northern
Republican control) and the disenfranchisement of blacks.336 Committee
testimony read during the House floor debates contained accounts of Klan
members using intimidation to deter blacks from voting Republican, but
refraining from attacking blacks who they convinced to vote Democratic.337
It appears evident that, though race was a motivating factor in Klan
violence against blacks, black suffrage and black free labor were just
components of the Klan‘s hatred of Republicans.338
The most defensible conclusion drawn from an examination of the social
history of the Reconstruction South and the legislative history of the Ku
Klux Klan Act is that Congress intended to address violence motivated by
either racial hatred or antagonism against the opposing political party.

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50–64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86–87.
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.
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B. The Distinction Between Political Parties and Shared Beliefs
Is Consistent with Scott and Bray
The Second Circuit can adopt an interpretation of § 1985(3) that defends
against political affiliation–motivated conspiracies while remaining
consistent with Scott and Bray. In Scott, nonunion laborers claimed that
they were attacked because of opposition to their employer‘s use of
nonunion construction labor.339 The Court faced two definitions of classes
potentially protected by § 1985(3): a class defined by shared economic
ideology or a class defined by common economic conduct.340 Read
narrowly, Scott only excludes conspiracies motivated by shared economic
beliefs or activities. This is supported by the Court‘s conclusion that
carpetbaggers were not targeted because of their independent economic
activities but because they were either Republicans or supporters of
blacks.341 The Scott Court called into question extending § 1985(3) to
politically motivated–conspiracies in dicta because of a concern over the
potential breadth of cases that may ensue.342
In Bray, the Court confirmed its position that common activities or
beliefs could not define a § 1985(3) protected class or class-based
animus.343 The Court rejected the argument of abortion providers and
women‘s rights groups that § 1985(3) protected women seeking abortions
or women supporting abortion rights from efforts by pro-life activists to
block access to abortion services.344 The Court found that permitting class
definitions based solely on common actions or commonly held beliefs
would turn § 1985(3) into the general tort statute opposed by the 42nd
Congress.345
The Scott decision does not preclude the Second Circuit from affirming
its Keating holding, which rejected the racial animus requirement for
asserted political affiliation–based conspiracy claims. The two cases are
distinguishable. Keating claimed his tenure rights as a civil service
employee were violated because he was a member of the Republican
Party.346 In Scott, the laborers were targeted because of each individual‘s
choice to work in the construction trade without joining a union.347 The
Scott Court‘s refusal to recognize a class based on the common activity of
unaffiliated individuals is consistent with the Court‘s goal to prevent
§ 1985(3) from becoming a general torts statute.348 However, Keating was

339. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
340. See United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1983).
341. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. Given the North‘s reluctance to adopt
racial social equality and identification of the Democratic Party with secession, a
carpetbagger would more likely be a Republican than interested in black suffrage.
342. See supra note 178.
343. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 158, 189 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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a formal member of a political party,349 whose membership is limited and
defined by the party itself and state election law.350 Recognition of
conspiracies motivated by membership in a state-defined political party
may allow application of § 1985(3) that is true to its legislative history
while precluding claims where the class is self-defined by its members
based on their shared actions or beliefs.
The Second Circuit, like it did in Keating, may refuse to require racial
animus in political affiliation animus cases based on the statute‘s legislative
history,351 notwithstanding the Scott Court‘s interpretation of that history.
Unlike the argument in Justice Blackmun‘s dissent, the Scott Court‘s
discussion of the statute‘s legislative history is limited to Senator
Edmunds‘s expounding on the scope of the statute352 and Senator Pool‘s
denial of any economic motivation for Klan violence.353 The Scott Court
needed to look to the broadest statements of legislative intent because there
was no mention of the statute protecting collective bargaining rights in the
legislative history.354 The Court supported its rejection of the sufficiency of
economic bias absent racial animus to state a § 1985(3) claim with floor
statements that elevated the Southerners‘ political motivations over their
animosity toward carpetbaggers, a symbol of Northern economic
exploitation of the South.355 The federal government would not protect
collective bargaining rights until the mid-1930s.356 Conversely, the
legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act is replete with congressmen
decrying Klan‘s targeting of Republicans for electoral gain.357 The Scott
Court may have simply dismissed the abundance of references to protecting
Republicans as immaterial to the question of economic ideological animus.
Admittedly, the Second Circuit‘s requirement of the presence of racial
animus in political conspiracies not involving party membership is
consistent with Scott and Bray. In Scott, the Court found that laborers who
individually chose not to join a union could not claim class-based
discrimination based on their common activity absent some tangible
affiliation or racial animus.358 In Bray, the Court found that the planned
obstruction of abortion clinic operations motivated by opposition to
abortion did not give rise to a § 1985(3) cause of action.359 Similarly in
Gleason, the Second Circuit found that a political independent could not
state a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim motivated by opposing a sitting mayor‘s

349. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 5-300 to -310 (McKinney 2010).
351. See supra Part III.A.
352. See supra notes 172, 181–82 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 174.
354. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871).
355. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
356. See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-196, §§ 7–8, 49 Stat. 449, 452–53
(1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 42–43 (1937).
357. See supra notes 64–65, 72–87, 90–93, 97–98 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 167, 170 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 185–89.
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reelection.360 Both courts, concerned with the potential for an unlimited
scope of coverage, left the potential for a bright line regarding animus based
on political affiliation.
Formal party affiliation may be the best way to limit the scope of
§ 1985(3) claim while staying true to the intent of Congress. Political
parties are limited, predictable, and legally defined classes of individuals.361
The Second Circuit‘s rejection of political issue–motivated animus362
prevents the potential of an infinite number of class-based animus
definitions based on an indefinite number of potential issues or positions on
issues.
The Scott Court‘s concern that applying § 1985(3) to political
conspiracies absent racial animus would lead to abuses is addressed by the
Scott decision itself. The Scott Court claimed that absent the racial animus
requirement, courts would be open to claims against hecklers at political
speeches for violating the speaker‘s First Amendment Rights.363 However,
the Scott Court‘s state action requirement for § 1985(3) claims protecting
First Amendment rights would preclude the Court‘s hypothetical.
Additionally, application to cases concerning political patronage
positions would be precluded by the exclusively remedial nature of the
statute. Section 1985(3) does not create rights; it is only a remedy for
legally protected rights.364 Therefore, § 1985(3) would not apply to at-will
patronage jobs but only to positions covered by civil service protections.
C. Reconciling Keating and Gleason
The Second Circuit can and should clarify its position on the racial
animus requirement for politically motivated conspiracies to clear up the
confusion among its component district courts without overruling Keating
or Gleason. Drawing a bright line between conspiracies motivated by the
target‘s political affiliation and conspiracies motivated by opposition to an
issue or candidate would fulfill both of these goals.
This distinction is the principle difference between Keating and Gleason.
In Keating, Keating was explicitly told that he lost what he believed to be a
civil service position with tenure rights because of his political party
position.365 He was denied equal protection of a legally recognized right
because of his formal membership in a political party. The Keating
holding—the plaintiff could state a § 1985(3) claim based on party
affiliation animus, absent racial animus—would be affirmed by a circuit
decision clarifying the distinction between party membership and mere
political opposition.
Similarly, all but the Gleason dicta on the racial class-based animus
requirement would be affirmed by a court decision clarifying the distinction
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

See supra notes 258–61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979).
See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
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between party membership–based claims and political opposition–based
claims. In Gleason, the court rejected a political independent‘s claim of
discrimination motivated by electoral opposition in a previous mayoral
campaign.366 This result and more recent Second Circuit decisions
concerning politically motivated conspiracy claims367—absent party
membership—would be affirmed by drawing this distinction.
D. The Impact on District Court Holdings
Adopting a bright-line rule distinguishing between conspiracies
motivated by political affiliation–based animus, and those motivated by
common beliefs or activities will impact how some of the district courts
within the Second Circuit interpret Scott, Keating, and Gleason.
Part III.D.1 explains that the proposed bright-line rule would have had little
impact on the dispositions of the previously discussed cases from the
Northern and Eastern Districts of New York. Part III.D.2 describes how the
proposed bright-line rule would repudiate the Western District of New
York‘s approach to interpreting the meaning of Gleason and Scott.
Part III.D.3 discusses how the proposed bright-line rule would resolve the
potentially conflicting approaches employed by judges in the Southern
District of New York.
1. The Proposed Standard Is Consistent with Holdings
by the Northern and Eastern Districts of New York
Little would change in the Northern and Eastern Districts of New York if
the Second Circuit adopted the reconciliation of Gleason and Keating,
proposed in Platsky.
In the Eastern District of New York case Fishman v. County of Nassau,
Fishman claimed that he lost his county employment solely because of his
political party.368 Under the proposed reconciliation, because Fishman‘s
government employer conspired with the Republican Party leadership to
discriminate against Fishman because of his membership in the Democratic
Party,369 the claim would remain actionable. The only difference would be
that the district court would not have to rely on precedent of doubted
validity.
In a hypothetical case similar to Platsky v. Kilpatrick, but where there
was sufficient linkage between class animus and the defendant‘s actions,370
a district court applying the proposed distinction may find a § 1985(3)
claim actionable. In Platsky, Henry Platsky claimed that he faced
harassment, intimidation, false arrest, and eviction because he was an
avowed Socialist who belonged to numerous Socialist organizations.371 If
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

See supra notes 258–61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 264.
See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
Contra supra note 268 and accompanying text.
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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the same case were to arise today under the proposed standard, the district
court would dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff was enrolled in a
Connecticut town Socialist Party.372 The plaintiff may be a member of
groups of self-identifying Socialists, but there would be no party affiliation.
If the Socialist Party did exist within the Second Circuit and a conspiracy
was motivated by membership in that party, a claim would be actionable
under the proposed standard.
The disposition of neither Northern District of New York case, both
discussed in Part II.C.1, would change under the proposed bright-line rule.
In Barber, Robert Barber and William L. Nikas alleged that defendants, the
Washington County District Attorney and other county officials, conspired
to maliciously prosecute the plaintiffs on bribery, fraud, and conflict of
interest charges.373 The plaintiffs further alleged that the conspiracy was
motivated by their common support for a county-funded construction
project.374 In Citizens Accord, the plaintiffs were members of a non-profit
group interested in promoting responsible land use control.375 Under the
proposed standard, a district court would find neither claim actionable
because in each case the proposed purely political class was not a political
party. The only difference in a future case would be that the district court
would not have to apply Keating while doubting its continued validity.
2. The Proposed Standard Strikes Down
the Western District of New York‘s Racial Animus Requirement
The proposed standard that preserves Keating would overturn the
Western District of New York‘s imposition of a racial animus requirement
for purely political classes. In Juncewicz v. Patton, Juncewicz was a civil
service employee who claimed she lost her job in an act of political
retribution for her husband‘s failure to support their county party‘s
chairman.376 Though the Juncewicz court‘s interpretation of § 1985(3) and
the proposed standard would result in the same disposition, the reasoning
would be different. The Western District dismissed the claim because the
asserted class was defined by political affiliation or association.377 Under
the proposed standard, because the case appears to be an intraparty
squabble, where personal opposition motivated any conspiracy, the fact
372. See
Minor
Parties
in
Connecticut,
CONN.
SEC‘Y
OF
STATE,
http://www.ct.gov/sots/cwp/view.asp?a=3179&q=532972 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (no
socialist party with statewide enrollment privileges in Connecticut). The claim would be
dismissed if it arose in New York or Vermont because neither state has a Socialist Party. See
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, NEW YORK STATE VOTER REGISTRATION FORM,
(June 2013), available at http://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/download/voting/
voteform.pdf (not listing the Socialist Party as one recognized by the New York State Board
of Elections); Parties, VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://www.sec.state.vt.us/
elections/parties.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
373. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 286, 289 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 301–03 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
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pattern lacks animus based on party enrollment. The case would fall under
the second prong, requiring racial animus in political cases based on
opposition to a candidate, issue, or common activity.
3. The Proposed Standard Resolves the Inconsistency
in Southern District of New York Holdings
Under existing Second Circuit jurisprudence, the Southern District of
New York consistently denies purely political § 1985(3) claims that are not
based on political affiliation.378 However, the court has produced
inconsistent results with regards to political affiliation based § 1985(3)
claims.379 In Fulani, the court heard a discrimination claim made by
political independents alleging an infringement of rights motivated by the
plaintiff‘s support for Ralph Nader over John Kerry. The court dismissed
the case, articulating a rejection of all purely political class–based animus
claims, including classes defined on the basis of political party
affiliation.380 Two years later, the court, in Lederman, signaled a
willingness to apply Keating when it denied summary judgment despite
Lederman‘s claims based either on disfavored political behavior or
affiliation with a First Amendment advocacy group.381
Adoption of the proposed standard would not change how the Southern
District of New York decides purely political § 1985(3) claims based on
shared political ideology or political beliefs. Absent formal party
affiliation, those claims would be dismissed. Under the proposed brightline rule, the Fulani case would result in the same disposition: dismissal of
the § 1985(3) claim. However, under the proposed bright-line rule, the
§ 1985(3) claim of political independents alleging a conspiracy motivated
by opposition in an election absent racial animus would be dismissed for
failure to allege political party animus.
Finally, adoption of the proposed bright-line rule may narrow
circumstances where § 1985(3) claims may be made for purely political
conspiracies. Unlike Lederman, which entertained the possibility of a First
Amendment advocacy group being protected as a political party, under the
proposed standard, the statute would only apply to conspiracies motivated
by membership in an officially recognized political party. Treating every
advocacy group like a political party would allow any group of people
defined by a shared position on an issue or opposition to a candidate to fall
under the statute by virtue of incorporating under state law. This would
defeat the limit the Gleason court intended to impose.

378. See supra Part II.C.2.
379. Compare supra notes 306–10 and accompanying text, with supra notes 311–17 and
accompanying text (demonstrating the inconsistency between two judges in the Southern
District of New York: Judge Preska‘s broad rejection of political party–based animus with
Judge McKenna‘s leaving open the question of § 1985(3) protection for First Amendment
political groups).
380. See supra notes 308–09 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 311–17 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
In light of recent accusations of political bias at the IRS,382 it may be an
appropriate time to reassess the potential for existing statutes to remedy
party affiliation–motivated discrimination. Though not a perfect fit,
rejecting a racial animus requirement on purely political conspiracy claims
motivated by political party animus but imposing the requirement for all
other political conspiracies may preserve § 1985(3) as a remedy for Tea
Party groups combating the IRS‘s alleged discrimination. The ability of
Tea Party groups to take advantage of § 1985(3) under this standard would
depend on whether the court believes the Tea Party organizations are
independent advocacy organizations, unprotected by the standard proposed
in Part III, or an organ of the Republican Party as some pundits have
suggested.383
The Tea Party aside, the existing § 1985(3) jurisprudence created an
inconsistency in the application of the statute.384 This Note suggests a
solution the Second Circuit may adopt to resolve the inconsistencies in the
application of § 1985(3) among its district courts, absent clarification from
the Supreme Court. However, only the Supreme Court can reach an
ultimate resolution of the question of a racial animus requirement for purely
political conspiracies. It would require a Supreme Court decision on the
issue to resolve the nationwide circuit split.

382. See supra notes 1–7.
383. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Parts I.C, II.A–C.

